by liberal japonicus
The choices are 1) Thank God! or 2) About fukking time!
This is an open thread about the election that we have all been hungry for. (that was my second choice for a title). I highly recommend this Foreign Policy podcast with Adam Tooz, about Hungary. I’ve cued it up to the spot, though the first part is also interesting.
I think that it is clear that Dems are anti-THIS war and I’ve seen/heard many put that in the context of wasted money better used here. This is a different time than Viet Nam and the war in Iraq. It doesn’t seem like there’s much “You must support the war or you are an unpatriotic pacifist wimp” as I remember. Is it possible that some learning has occurred in the general population? It just doesn’t seem like jingoism has much support this time.
…are as useful as a cavalry charge and a massive cost sink.
Just you wait. There are already robo-dogs and mules, why not robo-horses too (with laser beams!)? And being a cost sink is a feature.
I rather like wonkie’s “anti-jingoism” idea for a label. Even if a big chunk of the population has to look up the word, it at least avoids hitting any hot buttons.
Plus, it sums up the Democratic position (including the flat out anti-war faction). Not to mention the popular mood.
P.S. Pity America First [But Not America Only] is already taken. Ah well, nobody said it was a perfect world.
Thread hijack!
Gerrymandered districts summed up by, of course, xkcd:
https://xkcd.com/3236/
Yes, I think “anti-war” is a ridiculous slogan and an own goal in much the same way as “defund the police” – it lays the road open for your opponents to walk through. As for anti-militaristic, I’m all for it, as well as anti-jingoistic, but I don’t think they do as rallying cries. I’ve said before (probably at boring length) how the ridiculous cosplay posturing of Hegseth and Trump (“warfighters”, “Secretary of War”, “lethality”) is nothing but an open demonstration of their pathetic, macho attempt to ape “real men”, a clear development of “fuck your feelings”, and an obvious demonstration of their inadequacy. But alas, not obvious enough to almost half the US population. Although that may be changing – apparently 1 in 5 Trump voters is now in favour of impeaching him….
I too like Buttigieg, but I’m scared. It’s so obvious to me (and probably to most of us) that he has the right stuff, but one has to think about the prejudices of the electorate. Which, I know, may not always have been the best way to think about it. It’s a hard one.
Meanwhile, a court has apparently stopped the Virginia anti-gerrymandering action (ironic name) in its tracks, at least temporarily…
My position is to be anti-killing. Hesgeth’s “lethality” is a fancy word for killing people.
Don’t have a war, because people will be killed. If you do have a war, conduct it such that as few people as possible are killed.
I too like Buttigieg, but I’m scared. It’s so obvious to me (and probably to most of us) that he has the right stuff, but one has to think about the prejudices of the electorate.
The prejudice against gays continues. But it is far, far decreased over the past decade or two. (Not to mention the change since I was young!**). To the point that I’m not sure how significant it is for those under 45 — excepting those reactionaries who are out of reach already.
In addition, I think Buttigieg’s run for the nomination broke down the barriers even further. It gave a high profile to a gay man who simply wasn’t scary. Somewhat similar to how discovering that friends, family, and coworkers included gays broke down barriers, even with people who had been pretty strongly negative before.
2020 was never going to be his time. But it broke open a door that I think he could successfully walk thru next time. Wails about “But he’s gay!!!” would, next time, get a LOT of responses like “Yeah, we know that. So what?”. Simply from increased familiarity.
** For those too young to remember, one of the standard epithets used by LIBERALS *against* Ronald Reagan was “Ronnie Buttf*ck”. How the world has changed!
My comment about Buttigieg was less about him as a potential candidate and more for him as an exemplar of how to talk about foreign policy with substance and effective critique without wandering into any rhetorical minefields. I think all the younger Dems should be looking to him and to AOC and studying their communication styles – Buttigieg for outward facing coms and AOC for keeping the center and the activist edges pushing towards a common goal of a more just and inclusive society. Anyone who could become accomplished at both of these would be a good face for the party.
For those too young to remember, one of the standard epithets used by LIBERALS *against* Ronald Reagan was…
I’m not too young to remember, nor too old, but I have no recollection of this whatsoever. An online search returns no relevant hits. Was there some reason I’m innocently unaware of for this epithet?
Was there some reason I’m innocently unaware of for this epithet?
Perhaps it was only in use amongst Berkeley California radicals, and I encountered it verbally. But my memory is that it was pervasive here.
Maybe you had to be in an American college. Liberals (and hippies) despised Reagan anyway, but especially after Kent State. And in those intensely homophobic times, and given that he was an actor, I wouldn’t be at all surprised if that and other such casual slurs were directed at him by people who detested his politics.
It’s funny: we always thought it couldn’t get much worse than Nixon when he was POTUS. Then we thought it couldn’t possibly get worse than Reagan, and even more so Dubya. We have learnt that it can always get worse.
That particular homophobic slur was widespread and not particularly attached to any one person, public figure or not. I remember (in the early 90’s) a couple of gay classmates who were using it to express their personal loathing of each other.
Different times. Hard to imagine hearing it from any but the most aggressive and regressive right wing students today. And if they did use it, it wouldn’t be in casual conversation.
All of which is to say that, I suspect, a gay man would have a better chance at winning the Presidency than a woman. Basically, misogyny is now more pervasive than homophobia. Not a turn of events one would have predicted a few decades ago.
Basically, misogyny is now more pervasive than homophobia. Not a turn of events one would have predicted a few decades ago.
I would disagree. Misogyny has always been there and present. Homophobia is seasonal. Imo most people do not think about the topic unless some group (political and/or religious) is pushing it. Most gays and lesbians are essentially invisible, they do not stick out (btw the same is true for Jews, the target of usually the same groups for the same purpose) unlike women (even or particularly in a burqa).
To be nasty: Women are always there (visibly) as – unwilling – sex objects and targets of male desire. TEH GAY has to be pushed as a threat to yourself and/or your children by malevolent actors. Given that in most societies men dominate, misandry (real or perceived) is mostly irrelevant or a factor to further heighten misogyny.
Misogyny is as such ‘natural’, homophobia artificial. So, I would expect the former to be a constant (of varying degree*), the latter to be a negligible factor once it loses its usefulness as a wedge tool (there are numerous other groups to target instead).
*a variable constant, something for the math inquisition 😉
The challege I have with this thesis is this: I can remember growing up, when (not serious but still) accusations of homosexuality were a fairly common slur among my peers. Even though none of us knew anyone who was homosexual. (Statistically, there must have been at least a handful in my high school class, since it was around 250 kids. But they were pretty thoroughly closeted.)
Nobody saw homosexuals as any kind of threat. Nobody was pushing them as a threat. It was just a “bad thing.”
wjca, I’d bet that when you were growing up that there are also insults thrown that someone was a “commie”. With zero understanding of what that was, except “it’s bad”.
Stupid kid behavior is no basis for a system of government! But here we are.
The ‘it’s bad’ (as far as homosexuality is concerned) is imo always pushed by someone, the kids do not develop it themselves. Bad feelings towards the other sex due to denial of sex is something they do not have to be taught (although it of course helps /s).
The “I know that X is bad, although I do not know what X is” is a typical sign of external influence with a purpose.
The example I often quote is that little kids in Eastern Germany (not of ME origin) ‘know’ that to call someone a Jew is the worst of insults without having any idea what a Jew is (and there likely is none within many miles. There the culprit used to be easy to identify: grandparents that had spent their childhood in the 3rd Reich and became adults in the GDR (where the Party often used antisemitic undertones despite its professed antifascism). Nowadays it’s of course the AfD desiring to recruit the youth and knows that one should start during toddlerhood.
Caveat: involuntary confrontation with gay pörn on the internet could play a role these days. But a lot of common straight stuff looks disgusting to minors too (not limited to minors for sure).
misogyny v homophobia debate is one of those that is crippled by our desire to rank
misogyny has basically been around for 5000 years straight
[so misogyny worse!]
and so women have been able to develop strategies to undercut it
[so homophobia is worse!]
Homosexuality has been accepted in various societies, but suppressed in western contexts
[so homophobia is worse!]
but women have been denied becoming the best versions of themselves
[misogyny worse!]
All due respect to everyone here talking about it, but it’s not really a debate that produces a meaningful answer. I realize that won’t stop people from talking about it, but bad shit doesn’t always have to be put on a scale.
I had no intention to ‘rank’ them. Both are treating large groups of people as subhuman with often murderous consequences. I was primarily discussing the varying amount of it present in (Western) society in our lifetimes and possible reasons.
Ranking of victimhood is pernicious and all too often used for nefarious purposes (and often pushed by the very same groups that perpetuate the hatred). Again a German example: It took decades to get monuments for the non-Jewish victims of the Nazis (including gays) because one side saw* it as diminishing the singularity of the crime against Jewry, others refused to honor e.g. ‘gypsies’ and gays because they were still targets of legal discrimination. The GDR on the other side in essence excluded all non-communist victims (and suppressed the sordid history of Hitler and Stalin cooperating in murdering German communists). I guess in the US there is something similar between the native American victims of genocide & discrimination and blacks with slavery & Jim Crow.
*which in turn still inspires antisemites and holocaust deniers accusing Jews (and Israel, there with at least some justification) of trying to profit of their victimhood (while calling it a hoax).
This is the latest from Comment is Freed, for anyone who is interested:
The US no longer leads
The changing context for UK defence policy
Lawrence Freedman
Apr 25
One of the most important tasks of political leaders at times of crisis is to explain to the public the seriousness of the situation and possible courses of action. Perhaps the government assumes that the nature of the current crisis is self-evident, that it is understood that so long as the Strait of Hormuz remains closed the conditions of life not only in the UK but around the world will worsen. The future of US-Iranian negotiations remains clouded in uncertainty but even if an agreement on the Strait is reached soon, it will take months before the backlogs are cleared and supply lines get back to normal.
The crisis however goes much deeper, because the current situation is the result of a catastrophic set of errors by the Trump administration. We have been witnessing the astonishing picture of one of the greatest powers the world has ever known wilfully weaken and undermine itself so that it no longer is either willing or able to play its accustomed role in the international system.
This is not an easy aspect of the current crisis to address for governments closely allied with the United States. They do not want to give up on the multitude of defence and security arrangements, including NATO, that have bound them together and have led them to look to Washington for leadership. It is even more awkward to acknowledge that one reason for this is that the President is unhinged, uninhibited in launching insults at foreign leaders, including the Pope, and with no coherent agenda other than servicing his own ego. His ‘MAGA’ coalition is already fracturing, as its hero has blundered into exactly the sort of Middle Eastern war he was pledged to avoid. Perhaps the current dramas will become too much even for his own party and cabinet to bear, although there are no signs of that happening yet. Eventually he will leave office but by the time he does so the world will be a different place.
However difficult it might be to talk about this aspect of the current crisis candidly it is essential that ways are found to do so, because only then can the full implications for the UK and its European partners be appreciated.
In particular this is why it is essential to end the Treasury block on the Defence Investment Plan, which was supposed to have been announced at the end of last year. There is a commitment to get core defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2027 and then 3 per cent in the next parliament and to 3.5 per cent by 2035. This is required to begin to compensate for decades of under investment, leading to the serious deficiencies set out so clearly in last year’s strategic defence review, whether in logistics, recruitment, cybersecurity, ammunition stocks or heavy equipment.
The weakness of our armed forces, especially the Royal Navy, has become even more painfully apparent in recent weeks, as it struggled to get a single destroyer to the region. The delays caused by the Treasury/MoD standoff has meant that instead of a start being made on improvements there has been further deterioration, even as the international situation has become more urgent. When the announcement eventually comes questions will be asked about what this means for other areas of public expenditure or how can the Treasury be sure that money will be spent more wisely than in the past. But that will be the wrong framing. The issue is the dramatic shift in the international system. The government seeks to play a leading role in addressing the various resulting crises from Ukraine to the Strait of Hormuz, yet its credibility in these efforts is undermined by its reluctance to commit the necessary resources.
It has become something of a cliché for some years, at least since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that the current security environment is the most challenging since at least the end of the Cold War. But it has now acquired extra layers of challenge that requires a reappraisal of all aspects of foreign policy, and indeed in some instances of domestic policy as well. After describing how this has come about, I will then turn to the current crisis over the Strait of Hormuz, before concluding with some suggestions about possible ways forward.
Layers of Challenge
The Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 provided the first warning that the comfortable assumptions about the stability of the European political order could no longer be taken for granted. At NATO’s September 2014 Cardiff summit the allies agreed ‘to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities.’ They agreed to take more seriously than before a target of 2 percent of GDP, which by and large they did.
The 2022 invasion of Ukraine, as a crude act of aggression, combined with an energy crisis, reinforced the sense of gathering danger. As Ukraine resisted, and NATO countries helped it do so, Moscow’s rhetoric became ever more shrill and threatening. There were questions as to whether the conflict could be contained or would spill out, with some in the Biden administration fretting about the possibility of nuclear escalation.
This provided yet another prompt to look again at defence capabilities with added urgency. And then with Trump’s return to the White House the issue required an extra dimension as he sought more than just ‘a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities’ but a completely new relationship. He wanted the Europeans to accept responsibility for their own security.
It was a challenge that Europeans largely accepted, as there was no reason in principle why this collection of rich nations could not cope with whatever threat Russia might pose in the future, at least in the conventional sphere. Their readiness to spend more on defence – up to 5 percent of GDP – could be offered to Trump as a major political gain, with the expectation that in return the US would retain its commitment to NATO along with the nuclear guarantee. Part of the calculation was that by going along with Trump’s core demands, alliance relations could be kept relatively harmonious.
One key concern shaping this approach was that if alliance relations got out of kilter, Trump might sell out Ukraine completely. When he came to power it was evident that he felt that the US should no longer donate to Ukraine’s war effort. If the Europeans wanted to support Ukraine then that was up to them. The concern in those early weeks was that Trump was so eager to do a deal with Putin to end the war that he would put unreasonable pressure on Kyiv to make unwarranted concessions. It was only with some effort from European leaders that Trump was persuaded to work with Zelenskyy and accept that Putin was not offering any serious concessions.
Later in the year he once again became more sympathetic to Russia’s demands that Ukraine hand over territory to Russia that it had failed to conquer. By this time, with the end of US donations and the growth of European support, as well as Ukraine’s own efforts, Trump had lost leverage over Kyiv. Now Zelenskyy openly resists the pressure to cede territory. Here there is an important lesson. When the Europeans put in the effort, in this case supporting Ukraine both financially and militarily, they can act effectively independently of the US.
To complicate matters further, during the course of the year it became clear that the issue was not just fundamental policy disagreements with Trump, but also the developing sense of chaos surrounding the administration. This was manifest with Trump’s tariffs, which he presented as the answer to all of America’s economic woes, and which he was prepared to impose on all trading partners, including allies, The actual impact of the policy was limited by its haphazard implementation – in the process creating an impression of an administration which didn’t really know what it was doing and why. This confirmed a pattern evident in other policy areas. The administration was thinly staffed, often with barely qualified people, with whole functions axed because they carried the whiff of woke.
This year Trump’s public appearances and demands have become increasingly unhinged. Perhaps some ideas were no more than teases in bad taste, such as urging Canada to become the 51st state, although these were backed by punitive sanctions. The push to acquire Greenland for the United States could not be dismissed. The hint that this could involve military means and the explicit threat of economic pressure demanded an unequivocal response. Those states that had worked hard to keep Trump on side – UK, France, Germany – could not fudge the issue. They made their disapproval clear. Trump soon backed off, largely because of unfavourable market reactions, but the damage had been done. The forms of dialogue over 2025 that had continued during 2025 became harder to sustain. Trump’s commentaries on his allies became more insulting and delusional. Rather than argue back the simplest approach was just to ignore him.
Iran
Then came the Iran War. Because we are still in the middle of this crisis and we do not know how it will end there is still a tendency to wait and see, as if once the Strait is open things will soon return to normal. I fear that this is complacent. Whatever happens now the knock-on effects are going to be substantial and calamitous for many countries and industries. As is always the case, it is the poorest that will suffer most. The immediate consequences are going to stress all governments. Inflation, shortages, flight cancellations will soon be dominating all public discourse.
This conflict has been mismanaged on a spectacular scale and has exposed the dysfunctions of the Trump administration. In itself this is a transformational moment in the international system.
A recent article in the New York Times by David Sanger, presenting the problem as one of contrasting negotiating styles, barely does justice to the scale of the problem. It is easy enough to capture the Iranian style. They are aware that Trump is trying to bully them so they have to demonstrate resilience, endurance and patience.
But how to characterise Trump’s style? We know how he sees himself – Sanger puts it as ‘the master of coercive diplomacy, forcing his opponents to capitulate quickly to American demands or face the threat of attack.’ He quotes veteran diplomat Robert Malley who worked the Iran file for both Obama and Biden:
‘Trump is impulsive and temperamental; Iran’s leadership is stubborn and tenacious.’ …. ‘Trump demands immediate results; Iran’s leadership plays the long game.’ …. ‘Trump insists on a flashy, headline-grabbing outcome; Iran’s leadership sweats every detail. Trump believes brute force can compel obedience; Iran’s leadership is prepared to endure enormous pain rather than concede on core interests.’
But this still makes Trump’s approach appear as a deliberate choice, rational in its own way even if counter-productive. This characterisation does not capture its full craziness, with its bluster, absurd rhetoric, delusion, incoherence and constant contradiction. Trump makes threats as if scripted for a bad B-Movie. (When telling the Iranians to accept a deal he said if they did not ‘the United States is going to knock out every single Power Plant, and every single Bridge, in Iran. NO MORE MR. NICE GUY.’)
Another story, this time in the Wall Street Journal, records his temper tantrums, ignorance of key features of the situation, limited attention span and loss of focus, preferring to talk about happier topics such as his White House ballroom. When the rescue of a US aviator was underway the journal reports that aides ‘kept the president out of the room as they got minute-by-minute updates because they believed his impatience wouldn’t be helpful, instead updating him at meaningful moments.’ He rationalises his own behaviour as an example of the long-discredited madman theory, as if performing as a crazy person might scare an opponent into more concessions. But this does not work when the working assumption is that he really is crazy. The conclusion is not that he can be calmed with more concessions but instead that he is an impossible person to deal with.
Because he has consistently declared victory in both the war and in the negotiations, even though the Iranians have been far from surrendering and have agreed to very little, he cannot be honest with himself or with the American people about the true situation. In line with this determination to prove that the US ‘has the cards,’ Trump is unwilling to acknowledge that Iran enjoys any leverage, even though it clearly does. On 17 April he boasted that the Iranians had ‘agreed to everything’, including turning over their ‘nuclear dust.’ The Iranians denied this, and it is reasonable to suppose that Trump made this made this all up, because that is what he does. We have reached the stage that any statements from Trump about the negotiations must be disregarded until they are confirmed by a more authoritative source.
Most seriously on 17 April an apparent opportunity to get the Strait of Hormuz opened was lost. After apparently being persuaded by Pakistan that if they ended their blockade the US would end its blockade of Iranian ports, they announced that they would do so. This was welcomed by Trump, but he then decided not to reciprocate by ending the US blockade, for this meant that the US was left with an advantage. Unsurprisingly the Iranians closed the Strait again. Since then the Iranians have fired on freighters while the US has boarded Iranian tankers.
The experience with calling off the blockades reinforces Iran’s view that the US does not negotiate in good faith. In 2018 he abandoned a serviceable agreement, negotiated under Obama, in the belief that he could get a better one. Twice in his second term negotiations appeared to be progressing, only for the Israelis to persuade the US that they would get a better result by bombing Iran. His all-purpose negotiating team of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have now got an impressive record of under achievement.
The Iranians have decided to harden their stance if only to underline the point that they cannot be cowed. It has moved aggressively in the other direction, demanding tolls, saying it will charge unfriendly countries more, and blocking any ships owned by countries sanctioning it.
It is quite an accomplishment to allow the Iranian regime to appear as the more effective strategic player. This is still the same regime that not that long ago was slaughtering its own people to suppress any insurrectionary tendencies. It would be surprising if there were not tensions between the IRGC hardliners who are seeking to impose their will on the world and more moderate types who are worried about how to govern a country with wrecked infrastructure and a collapsed economy, which has dared not turn on the internet for six weeks. But for now the regime is going to great pains to demonstrate unity, especially in the light of Trump’s claims about chronic infighting and splits. At least for now they have an agreed strategy. They are determined not to appear needy. They know Trump also wants to extricate himself from an unpopular war. But the tensions are there (see this from Ali Ansari) and likely to become important if there is actual progress in negotiations and hard choices have to be made about potential concessions.
The allies have every reason to be furious with Trump for starting a war without a plan for ending it. Yet it is Trump, in one of his vindictive moods, who is said to be plotting ways of demonstrating his displeasure at these European countries who have given insufficient support to the US. This apparently includes reappraising the US position on the UK’s claim to the Falklands. (I don’t think the US has ever backed the UK claim: the position was that the dispute should not be solved by force). At the same time he has been rewarding Russia, which has actually supported Iran, with eased oil sanctions and an invitation to the G20 summit in Miami.
After charting how unpopular Trump has become in Europe and elsewhere, even amongst those on the right who once supported him, Fareed Zakaria observes that:
‘countries have started making long-term policy shifts, and these will soon take on a life of their own. They realized that they had entrusted their security and well-being to Washington, and it has used this dependence to squeeze them hard. So, they have decided to buy insurance, to protect themselves from an unreliable America. And who can blame them?’
What is to be done?
It is possible that negotiations will resume in Islamabad. On past performance we cannot presume success but let’s hope that they do. The urgent priority is to get the Strait open. After that there is the nuclear issue, easing of sanctions, promises of no further aggression, and so on, which may be as intractable as before.
But whatever happens now, in its origins and its conduct this war is a symptom of something bigger and deeper. So long as Trump is in power it is hard to see how there can be normal relations with the United States. Even if a moderate Democrat becomes president in 2029 there will be no return to the position of 2024. Core capabilities will have been lost and key relationships attenuated. The US national security apparatus has been gutted and will need to be rebuilt. A return to civility and proper consultation will be a good start, but progress will take time. As always much will be determined by the first big crisis the new administration faces. There have always been major policy disagreements. That is not new. What matters is how they are handled.
For the next 30 months issues will keep arising in which it will be impossible to align our position with that of the Trump administration. Most importantly it will become necessary to find ways of dealing with problems without the US, often with countries which are not traditional allies. This has already happened with Ukraine and could happen should an agreement be reached in principle on the Strait which then requires practical action to demonstrate its safety to commercial shipping. If the Islamabad talks fail then it might be necessary to pick up the pieces to see if a broad based international coalition can do a deal with Iran. A year ago talk of Europeans taking more responsibility for their defence led to considerations of speculative scenarios involving a Russian push against a Baltic state. Now it involves coping with a series of ongoing challenges.
The obvious conclusion for the UK is that we need to strengthen our ties with the EU and this process has begun. It has also become routine to coordinate responses to new developments with the major European capitals. There is an argument for shifting defence procurement away from the US to European partners, especially as the US has begun to withhold deliveries to allies (the latest is Estonia) because the war has left it short in its inventories of vital systems. In practice this is going to be of marginal impact and there is going to be a degree of dependence on the US defence industry for years to come. At any rate the point is not to break completely with the US but to accept that our interests are no longer as close as they once were, and that in current circumstances it cannot be a high priority to accommodate American wishes.
If this is the case, and we must be able to act more independently of the US, then we must start to reorganise our armed forces to cope with the challenges they face, which means having deployable capabilities, properly kitted out. As things stand we are setting ourselves up for more embarrassments as we seek to contribute but then find that we have little to offer. This is not a difficult argument to understand but it needs to be made by the government with clarity and urgency.
The only way that Iran can have confidence that any “agreement” would not be summarily undone by Trump, is to include the provision that Trump be turned over to them, as part of the agreement.
Or his head, that works too.
Plus that of Hegseth. Maybe they would be willing to accept Miller’s too, if asked politely.
Btw, I read in the morning papers that His Orangeness now calls for kicking Spain out of NATO for lack of enthusiasm and support of His ‘it’s not a war, although I keep using the word constantly’.